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their prominence can be hard for even 
a casual observer to overlook. Animal 
signals therefore raise many scientific 
questions: What are their functions? 
What information do they transmit? 
How are they produced? And why did 
they evolve?
Pioneering empirical work on 
animal signals was carried out by 
Karl von Frisch, Konrad Lorenz, and 
Niko Tinbergen, three ethologists 
who were awarded the Nobel Prize 
in 1973. Karl von Frisch decoded the 
famous ‘waggle dance’ of honey bees, 
showing that seemingly insignificant 
dancing motions that bees make inside 
the hive can tell other colony members 
the precise location of distant food 
sources. Lorenz integrated himself into 
the daily activities of geese, allowing 
them to imprint on him, and he thereby 
identified many of the nuances of their 
communication. Niko Tinbergen, an 
astute field observer, disentangled 
signals that gulls and other animals 
use in territorial conflicts. Tinbergen 
was also responsible for bestowing 
an essential framework for studying 
animal signals — his ‘four questions’ 
about the phylogeny, function, 
development and mechanism of 
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The study of animal signals began 
in earnest with the publication 
in 1872 of Charles Darwin’s The 
Expressions of the Emotions in 
Man and Animals, which laid the 
basis for a comparative study of 
signals across all animals, including 
humans. Yet even before Darwin, 
the exceptional diversity of animal 
signals has gripped the attention of 
natural historians and laymen alike, as 
these signals represent some of the 
most striking features of the natural 
world. Structures such as the long 
ornamented tail of the peacock, the 
roaring sounds of howler monkeys, 
audible kilometers away, and the 
pheromone trails laid by ants to guide 
their nestmates to resources are each 
examples of animal signals (Figure 1). 
Indeed, because signals evolved for 
the purpose of communicating (Box 1), 
Primer signals or any other behavior. Together, these three scientists emphasized the 
importance of entering the perceptual 
world of animals to fully analyze and 
understand animal signals. Their work 
underlies much of the current scientific 
research on animal signals.
Subtleties of animal signals
Many animal signals may ‘jump out’ 
at the human observer, because 
they utilize sensory modalities to 
which humans are highly attuned, 
but other signals can be harder to 
detect, involving modalities that 
are outside our species’ sensory 
perception. For instance, electric 
fish utilize discrete pulses of electric 
discharge in aquatic environments 
to communicate. Given the diverse 
channels through which animals 
communicate — encompassing 
chemical, electric, acoustic, optical, 
and tactile modalities — there are 
clearly abundant avenues for signaling, 
as well as ample biological raw 
material that can be co-opted for 
signaling functions. This underscores 
an important lesson for researchers: 
not all animal signals are necessarily 
prominent, and so acute sensitivity 
Figure 1. Diversity of animal signals.
From top left: peacock (Pavo cristatus) displaying its elaborate tail feathers (courtesy of Jessica Yorzinski); wasp (Polistes dominulus) variation 
in facial ‘badges of status’ (courtesy of Elizabeth Tibbetts); chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) gesturing (courtesy of  Michael Tomasello); Túngara 
frogs (Physalaemus pustulosus) spectrograms of chuck calls (courtesy of Michael Ryan); mandrill (Mandrillus sphinx) colorful red face (courtesy 
of Mark Laidre); southwestern speckled rattlesnake (Crotalus mitchellii) with rattle exposed (courtesy of Harry Greene); peacock spider (Maratus 
volans) raising its legs and abdomen in display (courtesy of Madeline Girard).
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to the perceptual world and the 
environmental constraints faced 
by one’s study organisms is vital, 
otherwise many of the subtleties of 
animal signals may be overlooked.
Constraints and contexts
Even when signals occur in modalities 
familiar to humans, they may still prove 
challenging to detect due to selection 
pressures that favor subtlety over 
conspicuousness. Signals can thus 
vary along a continuum on a variety 
of axes, from ‘conspiratorial whispers’ 
(close-range, understated, and directed 
to a single recipient) to extremely 
prominent signals (broadcast over 
long distances to a large audience of 
recipients). Where a given signal falls 
on this scale will depend on many 
factors, including the social context 
in which signaling occurs, the chance 
of unintended eavesdroppers (e.g., 
predators) intercepting the signal and 
the environment through which the 
signal must travel. The environment, 
for instance, can impose strong 
constraints on the efficacy of signal 
transmission, distorting or degrading 
the signal as it travels to its target. 
Certain modalities may thus provide a 
superior solution for communicating in 
a given environment — e.g., acoustic 
signals for communicating in dense 
forests where visual signals would 
be inadequate. The duration of the 
signal also places constraints on 
which modality is optimal: viscous 
chemical signals that last for extended 
periods can serve well as long-lasting 
territorial markers, whereas rapidly 
fading acoustic calls will serve well 
as alarms that designate momentary 
external threats. Overall, environmental 
constraints shape the design of signals, 
especially a signal’s modality and form.
The social contexts of signaling, 
however, also matter, and animal 
signals are used in a variety of 
contexts, both between different 
species (e.g., signals used by prey 
to deter predators) and within a 
species (e.g., signals use for mate 
attraction, intimidating rivals, 
altering group mates to an external 
danger, or begging for food from 
one’s parents). In all these contexts, 
different types of information are 
conveyed (Box 2), which may at times 
necessitate different forms of signals 
to accomplish the communicative goal. 
For instance, Darwin pointed out that 
signals with opposite meanings often 
have opposite forms. This ‘principle 
of antithesis’, as he called it, explains 
why a dog approaching with hostile 
intentions instead of affectionate 
intentions exhibits such different 
signals: the hostile dog is prepared to 
attack and so assumes a posture that 
is in accordance with its readiness to 
aggress, whereas the affectionate dog 
does exactly the opposite to guarantee 
its lack of hostility is not mistaken. 
Thus, a signal’s design is also shaped 
by the information it must convey.
Cues vs. signals and the evolutionary 
origins of signals
An important distinction can be made 
between a cue and a signal. Like 
Box 1.
Defining signals and a framework for their investigation.
Signals can be defined in a four-part definition:
(1) acts or structures produced by signalers, which
(2) evolved for the purpose of conveying information to recipients, such that
(3) the information elicits a response in recipients, and
(4) the response results in fitness consequences that, on average, are positive for both the signaler and the recipient.
For example, when a hermit crab raises its claw, performing a threat signal, it provides information about its intention to attack, which a 
recipient can then respond to by fleeing, which ultimately results in both the signaler and the recipient benefiting by avoiding an esca-
lated fight.
Signal Information Response Fitness consequences
Threaten
Signaler’s
intention
to attack
Recipient
flees from
signaler
+
+
+ + –
– ––
Each part of the definition of a signal provides a guide to key empirical measurements that must be made to fully understand the signal. 
First, the form of a signal must be precisely described and quantified, often requiring specialized equipment (e.g., a spectrometer for 
reflected light signals or audio recording equipment for acoustic signals). Second, a consistent correlation must be established between 
the use of a signal and the particular contexts (e.g., signaler attributes or environmental parameters) that have relevance to the recipient, 
to show that the signal is reliably informative. Third, the probability of the recipient’s behavior changing between different states must be 
quantified after (compared to before) it received the signal, to show the signal alters the recipient’s response. And fourth, and perhaps 
most difficult, the impact on reproductive success that such signaling interactions entail must be established for both the signaling and 
recipient parties, to determine whether each party — as expected — is benefiting on average. Each of these objectives should ideally be 
examined both observationally during natural interactions as well as in experimentally controlled situations.
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signals, cues can provide information 
to others. For instance, the rustling of a 
mouse as it forages in the undergrowth 
is a cue that may convey information to 
a predator about the mouse’s location. 
However, this information is purely a 
by-product of the mouse’s foraging 
activity: the rustling was not shaped 
by natural selection to convey that 
information. In contrast, signals have 
been shaped by natural selection for 
the specific purpose of conveying 
information and thereby influencing 
others’ behavior, ultimately impacting 
both the signaler’s and the recipient’s 
fitness.
While cues differ from signals, 
many signals may have evolved from 
what once were cues. For instance, 
a number of species exhibit threat 
signals involving prominent postures 
or bodily movements that indicate an 
individual’s aggressive motivation or 
fighting ability. These threat signals 
are often abbreviated forms of a 
species’ natural attack pattern, with 
individuals exposing their weaponry or 
positioning themselves in preparation 
for conflict. Over evolutionary time, 
such intention movements appear to 
have been ritualized into prominent 
and highly stereotyped displays, which 
can convey the likelihood of an animal 
attacking. As such, animals need not 
always undertake an all-out escalated 
fight, but can potentially use relevant 
signals to make critical assessments 
beforehand. In a similar manner, 
Darwin first pointed out that many 
vocal signals that animals perform 
appear to have originated from altered 
breathing patterns that initially may 
have been cues, correlated with the 
types of physical action the breather 
was preparing to undertake.
The evolutionary process by which 
signals evolve from cues is known 
as the ‘signaler precursor route’. 
In this case, the signals originate 
from behaviors or structures that 
originally were informative aspects 
of the signaler and then were further 
specialized over evolutionary time to 
convey information more effectively. 
There is also another route for 
the evolution of signals: ‘recipient 
precursors’. In this case, recipients 
may have preexisting sensory biases 
that are either accidental or have 
been selectively favored in contexts 
independent of communication. For 
instance, females of a certain species 
might prefer and be attracted to the 
color red because their preferred 
food source is red. When such biases 
exist it may then favor the evolution 
of signaling traits that exploit the bias 
(e.g., males may develop red coloration 
to attract females for mating). Such 
sensory exploitation appears to have 
occurred in mate choice for many 
species, one example being the 
chuck call of Túngara frogs, which 
is extremely attractive to females, 
even females in species where 
males have never evolved the call. 
However, signals that have originated 
through recipient precursors need not 
remain entirely uninformative. Recent 
evidence in splitfin fish shows that 
even when signals originate from such 
‘sensory traps’ they can later become 
reliable indicators of key aspects of 
male quality.
Signals as information 
or manipulation
Sensory exploitation as an evolutionary 
source of signals raises a more general 
question: are signals fundamentally 
informative (providing the recipient with 
useful information that helps it choose 
the right response) or are they instead 
manipulative (deceiving the recipient 
by inducing a response that is good 
for the signaler, but not necessarily 
for the recipient)? If signaler and 
recipient have aligned interests, then 
this problem of manipulation does not 
arise; but if signaler and recipient have 
conflicting interests, then manipulation 
can be a problem. In a seminal paper, 
Richard Dawkins and John Krebs 
suggested that, from an evolutionary 
perspective, signals should be viewed 
as manipulative, as natural selection 
will always favor signalers that elicit 
responses that are in their own selfish 
interests, regardless of the fate of the 
recipient. Dawkins and Krebs went 
so far as to suggest that the idea of 
signals bearing information should be 
abandoned entirely.
The logic of this ‘manipulation 
argument’ was elegantly modeled 
with evolutionary game theory by 
John Maynard Smith. Maynard Smith 
envisioned a population of animals in 
which a certain signal reliably provides 
information to recipients, for instance 
by honestly indicating the likelihood 
of a signaler attacking. Now consider 
the consequences of a mutant that 
performed this same signal even 
when it did not intend to attack. This 
dishonest mutant would invade the 
population, because it could drive 
opponents away from precious 
resources despite having no intention 
to follow through with its signal. 
Eventually, the entire population would 
exhibit this dishonest signal, making 
the signal worthless and uninformative.
The problem of dishonest mutants 
seemed intractable until Amotz 
Zahavi suggested a solution: the 
‘handicap principle’. The handicap 
principle suggested that some 
signals might be too costly for a 
signaler to fake. For instance, certain 
mate attraction signals might only 
be produced by males that are of 
sufficiently high quality, because 
the costs to lower quality males of 
displaying these signals would be 
prohibitive. Parallel concepts had 
arisen independently in economics, 
where ‘conspicuous consumption’ 
and ‘extravagant wastefulness’ were 
suggested to reliably signal wealth 
among humans. For the handicap 
principle, in particular, the long train 
of the peacock seemed to provide a 
plausible example, given the expense 
Box 2.
Some types of information conveyed by animal signals.
Internal environment – signaler’s attributes
Species, sex, age, group membership, kinship, individual identity
Location (e.g., direction or distance from recipient)
Condition or quality (e.g., weight, body size, age, health, mating receptivity)
Fighting ability, strength, resource holding potential, or dominance status
 Motivational or affective state, emotions (e.g., fear or hunger), subjective resource  
 valuation, willingness to escalate a contest, aggressive intentions, probable future  
 actions (e.g., attack)
External environment – features of the outer world
 Referential designation of objects or events (e.g., predator presence or type, danger  
 level, or quantity or quality of food sources), either immediately present or remote  
 in space or time
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of growing and displaying such a 
costly structure for its bearer. Yet, 
the question remained whether the 
handicap principle could solve other 
cases of conflicts-of-interest between 
signalers and recipients; and if not, 
whether there might be other solutions 
for signal reliability.
Solutions for signal reliability
Recent work has indicated that the 
handicap principle is not the only 
possible explanation for the reliability 
of animal signals and, in fact, several 
mechanisms — not all of which require 
excessive production costs — may 
guarantee that signals continue to 
be informative over evolutionary time 
(Box 3). Indeed, when signalers and 
recipients are highly related to one 
another, or when they have minimal 
conflicting interest, then signals 
may be cost free, with certain types 
of ‘pooling equilibria’ emerging in 
which some signalers of different 
types employ the same cost-free 
signal. And even when signalers and 
recipients have strong conflicts of 
interest, theoretical models indicate 
that honesty itself need not be costly: 
all that is required is that each instance 
of lying that deviates from the honest 
equilibrium be met with high costs. 
Mechanisms for reliability in conflict 
situations, therefore, typically hinge 
on the fact that recipients of signals 
have their own evolutionary interests, 
so if signals do become unreliable, 
then it will no longer pay recipients 
to attend to them. The tendency of 
recipients to ignore unreliable signals 
should consequently put pressure 
on signalers to use only the types of 
signals that can be readily validated, 
based on differential signaling costs 
or benefits or based on the past 
signaling record of the signaler. 
Signalers and recipients will thus be 
dynamically coupled over time — even 
if one party attains an advantage for 
some period, over the long haul we 
should expect signalers to provide 
reliable information, and recipients 
to make use of this information, with 
both parties benefiting overall from 
their co-evolutionary relationship.
An important subtlety though is 
that while signals are predicted to be 
generally reliable they need not be 
perfectly reliable for recipients to still 
pay attention to them. As long as 
signals are ‘honest on average’ — 
that is, they contain enough useful 
information for recipients to be better 
off attending to them than ignoring 
them — then the signaling system 
can remain evolutionarily stable. 
Consequently, there is still scope for 
signalers to occasionally misrepresent 
their signals, with at least some 
dishonesty occurring at equilibrium. 
As Wolfgang Wickler noted, “We 
can really learn the truth about the 
evolution of signals best from the 
liars.” Thus, as long as deception either 
remains at a low enough frequency, 
is difficult for recipients to detect, or 
does not harm recipients’ fitness too 
drastically, it can persist. Interestingly, 
in stomatopod crustaceans, high levels 
of threat displays are observed when 
signalers are molting — a life stage in 
which the signaler is unable to follow 
through with its threat, so that the 
threat amounts to a bluff. Recipients 
nevertheless still flee from such bluffs. 
The reason bluffing remains stable is 
because only a small proportion of 
individuals are molting at any one time; 
threat displays overall are therefore still 
worth heeding, particularly because 
the costs to recipients of challenging 
true threats can be extremely high. 
Interestingly, in other systems, such as 
paper wasps, where black facial spots 
of varying size and shape are ‘badges 
of status’ that signal dominance, 
wasps whose facial patterns do not 
Box 3.
Factors guaranteeing signals remain reliable despite signaler–recipient conflict.
Index: these signals (sometimes referred to as ‘unfakeable’ or ‘assessment’ signals) are 
intrinsically anchored to an animal’s anatomy or physiology by physical constraints. Such 
signals are usually based on some structure that has been grown over an extended period 
and which allows recipients to assess the signaler’s resource-holding potential. The cost 
that stabilizes reliability is thus paid over the course of development, such as through 
investment in size or generation of a specific bodily organ. An example of index signals is 
the frequency of vocalizations in frogs, where pitch depth is constrained by the mass of the 
vocal chords, providing a reliable indicator of size.
Quality handicap: these signals are the type first envisioned by Zahavi in which the cost 
that stabilizes honesty is paid as the signal is produced. These signals ‘use up’ the quality 
being advertised — often because they are energetically costly — so only ‘high quality’ 
individuals can afford them. An example of quality handicap signals is the roaring of red 
deer, where the production of roars requires significant and prolonged movement of chest 
muscles and thus quickly exhausts ‘low quality’ individuals.
General handicap: these signals incur a production cost, but this cost is the same for all 
signalers. What differs between signalers is the benefits they stand to gain from success-
fully eliciting a response with the signal. Signalers that will benefit more (e.g., hungrier off-
spring) are more likely to signal (e.g., beg more often for food from their parents), indicating 
their greater need. An example of general handicap signals are the gaping mouth displays 
produced by begging chicks of many bird species.
Convention and vulnerability: these signals can be produced with minimal production 
costs and negligible difficulty. Their reliability is guaranteed by the fact that recipients 
frequently test signalers, probing them for weaknesses. Performance of some of these 
signals thus places the signaler at risk, either by exposing a vulnerable part of the body 
or precipitating attack. Individuals that perform these signals probabilistically suffer the 
potential for severe injury, so those who would be unable to bear the associated risk would 
find dishonesty unprofitable. An example are the black facial patterns (so-called ‘badges of 
status’) of paper wasps.
Reputation: these signals are not necessarily difficult or costly to produce, nor are they 
associated with attacks from recipients. These signals require only that signalers and recipi-
ents have prior knowledge of one another’s past signaling record, which occurs if individuals 
recognize one another, interact repeatedly, and remember the outcome of prior interactions. 
Signals produced by individuals who were dishonest in the past will be devalued or not 
responded to at all. Potential cheaters thus experience a tradeoff between the immediate 
benefits of successful dishonesty and the future consequences of losing their long-term 
credibility. An example of a reputation signal is alarm calling in vervet monkeys, where indi-
viduals whose alarms have been unreliable in the past fail to evoke responses later on.
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reliably reflect their true dominance are 
severely punished; and because high 
status individuals are frequently tested 
in this system, bluffing is rare.
Sexually-selected signals with 
multiple components
Given the mechanisms favoring 
signalers that provide reliable 
information, an important goal of 
studying animal signals is to isolate 
the specific information content of 
signals. This goal is perhaps most 
challenging in mate choice, where 
elaborate signaling traits have been 
shaped by sexual selection and 
can involve multiple components 
and modalities (e.g., males courting 
females by producing bright visual 
colors, sounds, substrate-borne 
vibrations, and pheromones, all 
simultaneously). An important 
question for such signals is how 
recipients integrate all this complexity 
and how they use this information 
to select mates. Two important 
hypotheses have been proposed 
for such multi-modal sexual signals: 
different signals might each convey 
different information (the ‘multiple 
message’ hypothesis) or different 
signals might convey the same 
information (the ‘backup message’ 
hypothesis). It is also possible that 
some sexually selected signals 
might not provide information at all, 
because they are still in a ‘runaway’ 
process of exploitation that has 
not yet stabilized. Researchers 
are beginning to understand how 
these different explanations might 
apply across animal species by 
experimentally altering certain signal 
components and determining what 
information recipients glean from them 
and how they alter their response. 
Another useful approach has been to 
carefully measure the specific signal 
components that recipients attend 
to most. For instance, researchers 
recently developed a portable eye-
tracking system to examine which 
elements of a peacock’s multi-
ornament display are visually attended 
to by females. Interestingly, females 
selectively attended to specific 
components of male’s courtship 
displays and largely ignored other 
components, which suggests some 
components might be differentially 
informative. Notably though, the 
interaction between different signal 
components sometimes functioned to 
more effectively capture and maintain 
female attention, so combinations of 
signals might synergize and exceed 
the effectiveness of any single signal 
component.
Interactive experimental approaches
While observation remains an essential 
first step in describing animal signals, 
experiments are critical for testing the 
accuracy of these conclusions and 
fully understanding the complexity 
of animal signals. A wide range 
of experimental approaches have 
been used to study animal signals, 
though perhaps most useful are those 
involving the interactive presentation of 
signals to live animals — what Donald 
Griffin has called “an experimental 
dialogue”. Such dialogues can be 
accomplished for signals from any 
modality by presenting the signal to 
recipients in controlled conditions (for 
instance, through acoustic playback of 
sound signals). Interactive models and 
robots, in particular, offer a powerful 
means of isolating the responses that 
signals elicit in recipients as well as 
the conditions under which signals 
are most likely to be produced. For 
instance, the development of an 
interactive female sage grouse robot, 
with a camera and microphones 
implanted inside the robot, has 
enabled researchers to examine 
how male sage grouse change their 
courtship signals based on a female’s 
orientation and postures. Such 
research can give insights into how 
signalers coordinate their signaling 
with moment-by-moment feedback 
from recipients.
From animal signals to human 
language
While animal signals can be 
complicated, they are dwarfed in 
complexity by human language. 
Language allows our species to 
transmit vastly more information than 
any animal signaling system and to 
communicate on any topic, new or 
imaginary. Humans can accomplish 
this feat because we are able to 
semantically reference anything 
around us with words and then create 
new meanings based on the unique 
syntax of altered word-orderings. In 
contrast, animal signals are often, 
though certainly not always, single 
isolated signals or repeated sets of the 
same signal, and they are generally 
dedicated to specialized functions 
that provide just a few categories of 
information.
It is notable that many aspects 
of human communication still have 
parallels with animal signals, being 
based on non-verbal gestures or facial 
expressions that are also found in our 
primate relatives. Some researchers 
have even suggested that gestures 
might have provided the first proto-
languages during human evolution; 
and it is interesting in this respect 
that attempts to teach aspects of 
language to nonhuman primates first 
met with success only after American 
Sign Language — a gesture based 
system — was used. Nevertheless, 
human language is far richer in its 
communicative potential than any 
nonhuman species can attain, even 
after dedicated training with human 
teachers, and this therefore raises an 
important challenge for research at the 
interface of animal signals and human 
language: how and why did language 
arise as a communication system and 
why is it that no other animal signaling 
system has the power of human 
language?
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